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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-2937
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TERESA M. FLOOD,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 1-06-cr-00125-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 23, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:May 6, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Teresa Flood appeals her conviction of one count of bank fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1344, two counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2 and 1028A, and two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1343,

arguing that the District Court erred in charging the jury with a “deliberate ignorance”
instruction. Because we reject Flood’s argument that the District Court improperly
instructed the jury, we will affirm her conviction.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Flood’s convictions arose out of several schemes in which she participated with
Glenny Coleman III, her former boyfriend and the father of her child. The superseding
five-count indictment charged her with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2 and 1344, two counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
1028A, and two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1343. Coleman
was charged in a fifteen-count indictment with crimes similar to Flood’s. Coleman pled
guilty to five counts, and the District Court sentenced him to 129 months’ imprisonment,
but Flood proceeded to trial to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against her.
At trial, Flood called Coleman, who testified that he had “duped” her and that he
was the “con man.” At the end of the trial, the District Court instructed the jury on the
charges against Flood and the elements necessary to prove those crimes. It also charged
the jury with the following “deliberate ignorance” instruction, over Flood’s objection:
“The government may prove that the defendant acted ‘knowingly’ by
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant deliberately closed
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her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to her. No one can
avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious.
Therefore, a person’s knowledge of a particular fact may be shown from a
deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate or intentional blindness to
the existence of that fact.
“It is, of course, entirely up to you as to whether you find any
deliberate ignorance or deliberate closing of the eyes and any inferences to
be drawn from any such evidence.
“You may not conclude that the defendant had knowledge, however,
from proof of a mistake, negligence, carelessness, or a belief in an
inaccurate proposition.”
The jury returned a guilty verdict on each of the five counts, finding that Flood
committed one count of wire fraud by submitting fraudulent information as part of an
application for the purchase of a car, on which a car dealership relied in approving a loan;
that Flood aided and abetted Coleman in one count each of bank fraud and aggravated
identity theft as part of his plan to obtain a $15,000 loan from Wells Fargo Bank; and that
Flood aided and abetted Coleman in one count each of bank fraud and aggravated identity
theft by participating in Coleman’s scheme to fraudulently obtain a mortgage loan, from
which Coleman correspondingly purchased a residential property, through the submission
of false identity and employment information in the application.
Following her conviction, Flood moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33. She argued that the “deliberate ignorance” instruction confused the jury
and neutralized earlier instructions defining “knowingly,” “willfully,” and “culpable
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participant.” The District Court rejected Flood’s contention, calling the jury instruction
“appropriate” based on the evidence, and denied both of her post-trial motions. At
Flood’s June 9, 2008 sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced her to 36 months’
imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $500 special assessment. Flood
filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we exercise
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the district court’s “refusal to give a particular instruction or the
wording of instructions for abuse of discretion,” United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d
498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003), but once an instruction has been given and “the question is
whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard, our review is plenary.”
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995). Because Flood “challenges
only the District Court’s decision to give the instruction – not the articulation of the legal
standard contained in the instruction – we review for abuse of discretion.” Eshelman v.
Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 439 (3d Cir. 2009). In our review, “we consider the
totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.”
Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coyle, 63 F.3d at
1245).
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III.
Flood contends on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion by giving the
“deliberate ignorance” instruction, asserting that it confused the jury based on the District
Court’s other instructions that defined “knowingly,” “willfully,” and “culpable
participant.” At trial, Flood sought to distance herself from Coleman, and argued to the
jury that she was not a “culpable participant” in his crimes because she lacked knowledge
of the schemes and did not willfully intend that the schemes’ larger objectives be
achieved.
On review, after an instruction has been given, “we generally ask ourselves
whether, viewed in light of the evidence, the charge as a whole fairly and adequately
submits the issues in the case to the jury, and reverse ‘only if the instruction was capable
of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.’” Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d
Cir. 1987) (quoting Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir.
1986)). We see no error in the District Court’s decision to give this instruction. Liability
for aiding and abetting, four of the five crimes with which Flood was charged, requires
“the specific intent of facilitating the crime,” United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 113 (3d
Cir. 1999), and we have held that a finding of “willful blindness” or “deliberate
ignorance” satisfies the intent prong for such a crime, see, e.g., United States v. Leahy,
445 F.3d 634, 652-54 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, the District Court acted properly in
instructing the jury regarding the definitions of adequate mental states.
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Turning to the “deliberate ignorance” instruction at issue, such an instruction
“allows the jury to impute the element of knowledge to the defendant if the evidence
indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid knowing what was taking place
around him.” Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1991)). We have upheld such an
instruction “where the charge made clear that the defendant himself was subjectively
aware of the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man
would have been aware of the probability,” and where “[t]he jury could have found that
[the defendant] deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to
him.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d
112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The evidence at Flood’s trial supported the inference that she may have been
deliberately ignorant as to Coleman’s crimes. Despite Coleman’s testimony at Flood’s
trial that he “duped” her, the evidence reflected her assistance in several of his schemes.
Further, Flood presented the defense at trial that she lacked the requisite knowledge to be
found guilty of Coleman’s schemes, which also supports the District Court charging the
jury on “deliberate ignorance.” Examining the jury instructions as a whole, we are
content that they “fairly and adequately submit[ted] the issues in the case to the jury” in
presenting the law accurately and in light of the evidence at trial, and that, therefore, they
did not confuse or mislead the jury. Bennis, 823 F.2d at 727. Thus, we cannot say the
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District Court abused its discretion in including the “deliberate ignorance” instruction and
charging the jury as it did.1
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Flood’s conviction.

1

To the extent that Flood claims that the evidence upon which the jury convicted
her was insufficient, we disagree. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the elements
of the crimes with which Flood was charged, and our determination that the “deliberate
ignorance” jury instruction was proper, the jury had sufficient evidence before it, on
which it could, and did, find Flood guilty of the crimes charged.
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